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o. Introduction. 
Anatoli Strigin 
Humboldt University, Berlin 
Dynamically oriented theories of semantics emphasize the context change 
potential of sentences. Context change potential depends on the context in which 
it is computed, since lexical expressions in any natural language tend to display a 
great number of contextually determined different readings. As context change 
potential is realized via update operations, updates of discourse record by 
sentences with such lexical expressions require computing contextual variants. 
Thus there is a need for a theory (or theories) of how to code the dependency of 
contextual variants on the context. 
In a number of theories dealing with this problem the point of departure is 
a very general underspecified lexical meaning which is seen as the contextual 
invariant of the semantics of a lexical expression and is made more specific 
according to the demands of the communication situation. Attempts to 
characterize this assumed more general kind of meaning are usually based on 
deductive mechanisms, using sometimes second-order logic, sometimes more 
general type systems, and designed so that The U {c_variantLd 1= semLE and The 
U {semLE} 1=t.J , . . .  ,& c_variantLE hold, where 1= is the relation of semantic 
entailment, The context, semLE semantic invariant of lexical expression LE, 
c_variantLE its variant in context c, and t.J, . . .  ,t.n are the stipulated rules of 
contextual variation which extend 1= by allowing the necessary inference. A 
simple theory of this kind would postulate the invariant to be the disjunction of its 
contextual variants, and infer the meaning in a context by letting those disjuncts 
which do not provide a reading in this particular context be false, i.e. let semLE B 
AJvA2vA3 and let The entail -,AJ&-,A2 . Then c_variantLE B A3. Note that AJ 
and A2 are simply false in this context, which is a poor rendering of the 
unavailability of a reading. More sophisticated theories use more sophisticated 
rules. The rules and the invariant are sources of difficulties, if contextual variation 
is strong. 
The meaning of the German preposition mit, which roughly corresponds to 
the English with, in its use as the head of a verbal modifier-PP shows a great 
contextual variability and depends in its meaning on the meaning of the verb it 
modifies, i.e. on the thematic structure of the situation. Simple-minded canceling 
of incompatible disjuncts is insufficient to characterize either its variation or this 
dependence. Moreover, even more sophisticated theories which use direct 
deduction seem to be ill equipped to provide such a characterization. Therefore, 
this paper proposes that update operations wrt. lexical items are based not on 
merely deductive, but on abductive inferential behavior, subsuming default 
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reasoning under the latter. It is assumed that the extreme multiplicity of the 
contextual variants of mit can be best treated as a case of abductive explanation 
for a very general invariant relation. The invariant relation is taken to be 
uninterpreted by itself, except for the type constraints for its two arguments. It 
therefore becomes plausible to resort to update which is conceived as a kind of 
explanation for the use of so general a relation; in other words, to explain mit in a 
context it is necessary to find some element in the situation which entails it. The 
central problem the paper discusses is how to specify the abducible predicates for 
mit, i.e. the range of possible choice for its contextual variants. It is suggested that 
the source of explanatory hypotheses is the semantic structure of the situation 
typified by the verb, including the world knowledge which stereotypically relates 
individuals, etc. to a situation. Abductive inference including inference by default 
implemented in it casts a different light on the structure of lexical knowledge. In 
particular, since an update is claimed to consist of updating by a general relation 
and specifying it via abductive rules, there must be a connection between the 
general and the specific knowledge. The paper expresses this connection, by 
sentences called Craig interpolants. Using abduction raises objections in general, 
because it is a complex phenomenon, in particular computationally complex. But 
abduction in the lexicon is claimed here to be restricted by a situation parameter 
which narrows down the choice of hypotheses, and makes it tractable, 
presumably. Though the paper uses only mit to argue the case, it seems that the 
overall picture of the lexicon in which abductive inference is used might give a 
new impetus to describing the meaning of other prepositions with the meaning 
dependent on other meanings, and, perhaps, such phenomena as argument 
selection. 
1. The data on mit, simple update and the problem of contextual variation. 
The main character of this paper is the German preposition mit which generally 
corresponds to the English with. The case under investigation is the verbal 
(sentential) modifier mit which is taken to be a two-place relation, the modified 
argument being of the type of situations, Ds, the complement is of the type of 
entities in general, De, i.e. I Imitl l E 2De X Ds. Modifiers like ein Buch mit Bildern (a 
book with pictures) will not be considered. The edge between modifiers and 
arguments is very narrow, and, if there is no need to draw the distinction, I will 
not, which does not mean that the distinction is unimportant, only that I will try to 
ignore it whenever possible, and try to stay clear of arguments. Observations 
about mit show an extreme variability of its meaning; starting from something like 
'x is instrumental in s' in (I)  we end with some poetical licenses which 
nevertheless are interpretable without a dictionary (h-j are due to Eroms, 1981) .  
( I)a. Karl schneidet den Fisch mit dem Messer 
Karl cuts the fish with the knife 
'Karl cuts/is cutting the fish with the knife' 










er blamiert sich mit seiner Rede 
he makes-a-fool-of himself with his speech 
'he made a fool of himself with his speech' 
er machte mit einer Zitronenplantage Pleite 
he made with a lemon-plantation bankruptcy 
'he went broke with a lemon plantation' 
er rill die Pflanze mit der Wurzel heraus 
he tore the plant with the root out 
'he tore the plant out by the root' 
er fiel mit dem Gesicht zur Erde 
he fell with the face to-the ground 
'he fell with his face to the ground' 
er starrte sie mit offonem Munde an 
he stared her with open mouth at 
'he was staring at her with (his) mouth open' 
Peter wascht das Auto mit Sorgfalt 
Peter washes the car with care 
'Peter is washing/washes his car with care' 
Ubrigens, mit dem roten Beutelchen wurde ich von ihr sehr ausgelacht 
by-the-way, with the red bag-little was I by her very laughed-
out 
'by the way, I was very much laughed at by her on account of the little red 
bag (Hesse, Steppenwolf) 
i. ?Die Augen flieBen mit Triinen 
the eyes are streaming with tears 
j .  ?? . .  Dorfer, deren Wege alle mit frohlichen Kirchglingem zurii.ckkamen 
. . .  villages, which roads all with joyful churchgoers back-came 
' . . . villages, the roads of which returned full of joyful churchgoers' 
(Jean Paul) 
The number of separate meaning classes was sometimes claimed to be as many as 
thirty, e.g. Mandel ( 1957). Ten seem to be usual (SchrOter, 1 990). Constraints on 
the variability of mit stem mainly from the character of the situation described by 
the verb and from the semantics of the complement DP of mit. The fact that verbs 
can be useful in classifying the uses of mit seems not to have been considered 
important. This reluctance to pay attention to the verb is puzzling. Consider (2). 
(2)a. John zerbrach den Spiegel mit einem Hammer/mit Maria 
b. 
c. 
John broke the mirror with a hammer/with Maria 
*der Spiegel zerbrach mit einem 
* the mirror broke with a 
der Spiegel zerbrach 
the mirror broke 
Hammer/mit Maria 
hammer/with Maria 
Although both (2)a. and c. can be used to describe the same situation, b. seems to 
be impossible, and not simply true or false. If the meaning of mit were a 
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disjunction of its contextual mearungs, we would expect this particular 
instrumental/agentive meaning be still present in (2)b. It seems there is a 
dependence of the meaning of mit on the meaning of the verb it modifies. 
I will propose that mit picks out some role for its complement determiner 
phrase (or noun phrase; the distinction is unimportant in this context) in this 
situation, the role which can be filled by an object in the described situation, but 
which need not be explicitly stated or required by the verb as its argument in the 
context; the type of situation in (2)b. can then be taken not to contain the 
instrumental role, which is therefore unavailable for mit. I will define what might 
be called the structure or the type of the situation to make this idea more precise in 
section 3 .  The dependence on the properties of the complement noun phrase of mit 
is somewhat more complex. Consider (3). 
(3)a. sie segelten mit dem Wind 
they sailed with the wind 
b. *sie fuhren mit der Strasse 
*they drove with the street 
c. *sie standen mit dem Wind 
*they stood with the wind 
Wind being a kind of movement, it has an inherent directional component; this 
component is lacking in case of the street. Stative verbs do not allow this meaning 
of mit either. 
The roles do not cover all possible relations in German; locative relations 
like 'over', 'in', or 'beside' are no interpretations of mit , hence I will assume that 
they seem to be, in general, excluded from defining the type of situation, though 
not from characterizing it. 
Examples (l )e.-g. and (3)a. suggest that either the notion of the structure 
of situation should be made very broad, or there is some other source of the 
interpretation of mit-PPs. I will assume that it is stereotypical knowledge relating 
objects of particular kinds to the situation of a particular type which provides 
additional variation space for mit, cf. (4). 
(4) sie schwimmt immer mit der Badekappe 
she swims always with the bathing-cap 
'she always swims with a bathing cap' 
There is a weak (perhaps default) inference that the bathing cap is on her head. 
Given that the information in the sentence is used to update any conversational 
record, it is difficult to maintain that a specific variant of mit is used at once. It is 
more plausible that we update by an underspecified relation, cmt(a.e), and use the 
context to specify it further. I will use discourse representation theory (Kamp & 
Reyle, 1 993) to exemplify the ideas of this paper. A simplified DRS for John 
schneidet Fisch mit einem Messer (John cuts fish with a knife) is given in Fig. I .  
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The relation cmt(e,v), read 'v is concomitant with e' represents the 
underspecified/general/context-invariant meaning of mit. 





s :cuts(j ,x) 
BACKGROUND (main DRS) 
Fig 1. 
Though the structure of the situation must be specified in more detail, this 
format will do to consider the problem of the mechanism generating the 
contextual meanings of mit, its contextual variants, as well as the restrictions on 
the variation domain. Theories using deductive reasoning are explanatory too 
weak for this. 
Thus, e.g. the theory of conceptual shift found in a number of variations in 
the work of Bierwisch and others, e.g. (Bierwisch, 1 989), (Bierwisch, 1 983), 
(Dolling, 1 994) assumes that a lexical entry contains the conceptually invariant 
part of a family of context meanings, its Semantic Form, SF; the lexical 
knowledge derives the contextual variants of this SF, and the conceptual system 
of the brain derives the specific instances of these contextual variants. The SF-to­
contextual-variant derivation is effected by a system of shifting functions. An 
example based on Bierwisch ( 1983), but changed slightly for the purposes of this 
paper, is the shift from some processes to organizations where these processes 
occur, and to buildings where they are located effected by (ii) and (iii) in (6). 
(6) the opera lasted three hours vs. is in debt vs. is at the comer 
(i) SF(opera) = sem, some set of operatic processes 
(ii) APA(y:abstract)3(x:abstract,process)[P(x) & organizationjor(y,x)] 
(shift to organizations) 
A(y:abstract)3(x:abstract'-process)[sem(x) & organizationJor(y,x)] 
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(iii) APA.(y:artefact}3(x:abstract--'process ) [P(x) & building_used jor(y ,x)] 
(shift to buildings) 
A(y:artefact)3(x:abstract--.process)[ sem(x) & building_used jor(y,x)] 
In case of mit some problems would be difficult to solve. There are 
too many shifters, they are not generalizable to other words, ad-hoc, and there 
seems to be no reason for the domain restriction. Lexical coercion in the sense of 
Pustejovsky (Pustejovsky & Boguraev, 1 993) is not directly applicable, because 
there is no need to coerce types. 
I suggest that the computation of contextual variants makes use of 
procedures best described as hypothetical reasoning. 
2. Specification by abduction, explanations and contextual variants of mit 
Suppose somebody hears a sentence <p with mit. Simple update implies she 
updates her knowledge with the result of the semantic processing of <p, in 
particular with some proposition informally renderable as cmt(a,s) for some 
discourse referents a, s; but if cmt(a,s) is a very general relation, it does not 
contribute to the contextual information of the hearer. A more informative update 
would add not merely cmt(a,s), but either use contextual information to deduce its 
more specific instance, or provide an explanation of its use. The basic idea here is 
to assume that any contextual variant of cmt(a,s) implies cmt(a,s), so that it can be 
considered an explanatory hypothesis of cmt(a,s) in the context, and this relevant 
hypothesis is the contextual meaning of cmt(a,s). This is abductive reasoning, the 
term due to Peirce ( 1955). It can be illustrated using implication to contrast it with 
deduction by the rule of modus ponens. The deduction goes like 'if p implies q, 
and you observe p, then deduce q', whereas abduction goes like (7), i.e. 
(7) D � fJ fJ 
P 
'if p implies q, and you observe q, then it may be the case that p obtains' . A typical 
example of this kind of reasoning is (8) (Pearl, 1 987). 




explain shoes-are-wet � rained-last-night 
The explanation grass-is-wet is not basic, one is usually interested in hypotheses 
which are not further explainable. The hypothesis sprinkler-was-on is an 
alternative hypothesis, so the space of abducibles must be restricted, or some 
choice criteria should be given to choose one explanation. This is a general 
problem. It is often assumed that the hypotheses are given by the proof procedure, 
but this could be too liberal a characterization of the use of abduction in meaning 
specification. Formally, however, the explanation space can be thought of as fixed 
beforehand. Suppose this is done. Then a new relation can be defined (Poole 
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1 987, 1 988) and used in inferring the contextual variants of underspecified 
meanings. This relation will be defined in two steps, (A) and (AD) in the language 
of first order logic. 
Let r be a set of facts; they cannot be contradicted or ignored. Let n a set 
of possible hypotheses, formulae without quantifiers, but possibly with open 
variables, and P a subset of the ground instances of n. Ground instances are 
instantiations of open variables by constants which can be supplied in the form of 
discourse referents during processing. 
(A) r u P  explains cp, r u P» cp, iff 
(i) r u P  1= cp 
(ii) r u P is consistent 
Since the notions used are first order, derivability, 1-, can be used instead of 
semantic notion of entailment 1=. Consider an example of such hypothetical 
reasoning: suppose it is known that instruments play some role in situations. Let 
'Vy'Ve(instrument(y, s) � role(y, s» e r be this knowledge. We know that 
instrument(y, s) e n, and observe role(a, s), then P = { instrument(a, s)} is the 
hypothesis which explains the observation role(a, s) together with r, i.e. a plays a 
role in s because it is instrumental in s. This framework allows to also use open 
formulae of the form \jI�Cp as hypotheses, formalizing default reasoning. Let r, 
n, P be as above, ll. a set of defaults. Let D a set of ground instances of defaults in 
A. Call D u P a scenario. Then 'cp is explainable' is defmed by (AD). 
(AD) r u D u P >>> cp iff 
(i) r u D u P 1= cp 
(ii) r u D u P is consistent 
i .e.  there is a scenario D u P explaining cpo Suppose r is empty, instrument(y, s) 
e n, and it is known that instruments play a role in situations as a rule, but not 
always, i.e. A = { instrument(y, e) � role(y, e) } now. Then, if role(a, s) is 
observed, it is explained by { instrument(a, s), instrument(a, s) � role(a, s)} using 
the default. 
In case of specifying the contextual meaning of mit, II is the set of its 
contextual variants when instantiated with discourse referents, call it I'Imit. So the 
meaning of mit in the context c, cmte e I'Imit, explains cmt, i.e. emte » >  emt for 
some contextually relevant nmit• The application of defaults will be taken up in 
the following section. 
3. Situation schemata as nmit> thematic structure, and local abduction 
IImit is given by the situation type defined by the verb. The word 'situation' is used 
here in two ways. In the first sense, situations are in the world 'out there', in the 
second situations are a cognitive indexing devicel . A situation scheme is then a 
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set of rules which representationally interpret a verb. Warrington (1 978) showed 
that there are two subsystems of the processing of the information about objects, 
the perceptual and the conceptual ones. The fIrst identifIes, e.g., whether two 
presented objects are simply two views of one and the same object, the second is a 
mapping of the schemes in the perceptual identifIcation system to the more 
conceptual schemata, and allows to draw inferences about objects. Patients with 
one kind of brain damage were unable to identify an oboe when simply presented 
in an untypical perspective, but 'recognized it' when it was named; others, with a 
different damage, were sure that it was the same object under both perspectives, 
but were unable to explain its properties, its use, or to relate it to other objects in 
general. Extrapolating these fIndings to the case of situations, it seems reasonable 
to assume that there are two systems involved in building situations, too. One of 
them takes care of perceptually defIned aspects of identifying whether the world 
at some particular time is in some situation, the other constructs a mapping of 
such perceptual subsystems to general conceptual systems. Hence there must be 
an interface between the two systems. Searle ( 1980) argued that there are aspects 
of knowledge which provide some general conceptual background for the 
meaning2• Take the verb cut. Cutting grass, paper or a cake are activities, 
differing, in particular, in the instruments that are used, and in the overall results. 
This background is the required interface. In other words, we have sometimes 
perceptually and always contextually grounded categorization patterns which I 
will call here situation schemata. They will be assumed to contain Droit. Situation 
schemata are therefore sets of fIrst order formulae with open variables, and have 
three structuring factors: event structure, relational structure, and thematic 
structure. Event structure specifIes such properties as whether the situation 
involves one or two events, is a process, etc .. Relational structure specifIes the 
relations which hold between the entities of the event structure, like causality, 
contingency, temporal structure. Semantically the most important part of a 
situation schema is its thematic structure. The cutting situation described by 
schneiden could look like (9) in case of cutting with scissors. Note that this theory 
is a set of hypotheses, except for the name of the situation, which is treated as a 
fact during update. It provides the connections among different subsystems 
relating to the same phonological form cut, etc . .  
(9) Situation-name: cut(s) 
in(s,e) , in(s,e'), 
e causes e' 
terminates( e' ,  prestate) 
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cames-out-cutting-program(x, e) 
human(x) 
cutting-instrument-in(z, e ') 
scissors(z) 
is-being-cut-during(y, e ') 
scissors-cuttable(y ) 
The name cut(s) gives access to the four eventualities of the event structure: the 
agentive event, the cutting event itself, the state of the theme (or patient) before 
the cutting event, and its state after the cutting event. The two temporal predicates 
terminates and initiates are described in Kovalsky and Sergot ( 1 986), x-time(e,t) 
specifies which time serves as a natural unit for the agentive evene. Other aspects 
of the formal relationship between events, states and times are specified in some 
conceptual theory of these factors, e.g. that any change of state is a result of some 
event, by default, etc .. Relational structure encodes that it is a causative situation, 
and characterizes the relations between states and/or events, e.g. it characterizes 
the state of the theme before and after the cutting event. Words like 'theme' 
characterize properly the third aspect of the situation scheme, its thematic or a­
structure. It relates objects which help to anchor the situation itself in the world to 
the events and states in the situation. These characteristics should be sufficiently 
detailed to take care of very specific inferences which allow us, e.g., to have 
expectations: if I ask somebody to cut the cake, I expect that she would use a 
knife rather than a scimitar or a lawn mower. But such detailed situation schemata 
are better not be taken as verb meanings. Verb meanings are constructed by 
another generalization, as Dowty ( 1991 ) suggested4• They are stated in terms of 
a-roles, which are defaults classifying the contextually explicit relations of a 
situation scheme, e.g. if the relation carries-out-cutting-program(x, e) is 
interpreted in the situation of cutting paper, then it is classified as an agentive 
relation at the next level of semantic abstraction by a prototype of causal 
situations, i.e. by a situation type. 
( 10) cut(s), in(s,e) , in(s,e') , 
carries-out-cutting-program(x, e) & e causes e' � agent(x, s) 
cutting-instrument(z, e') & e causes e' � instrument(z, s) 
is-being-cut-during(y, e') & e causes e' � theme(y, s) 
Given this formalization of situation and situation types, to get the interpretation 
of mit we connect it to thematic structure. One part of the interpretation of mit 
would explain cmt(a,s) by looking for a hypothesis in the situation s which is 
instantiated by a using a-roles as defaults. If such a hypothesis is consistent with 
the facts, it is the contextual meaning of mit. Presumably, a-roles are a special 
kind of relation. If we collect all a-roles relevant in the situation under the 
predicate role(x,s) by the defaults like the ones in (1 1 )  
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( 1 1 )  agent(x, s) -+ role(x, s) 
instrument(z, s) -+ role(z, s) 
theme(y, s) -+ role(y, s) 
then cmt(a,s) will be connected by the default to a-roles via the default ( 12) 
( 12) roJe(a,s) -+ cmt(a,s) 
The default ( 12) is the inference rule used to specify contextual variants of mit, 
and motivates the term thematic preposition wrt. mit. 
4. Abducing to thematic structure 
The update stopped as shown in Fig. 1 .  Now it may be continued to yield Fig. 2, 
by substituting ground instances of the situation type for cut; the discourse 
referents of Fig. 1 are modified accordingly. 
S e j  X y e' s s' 
cut(S) 
e causes e' 
JohnO) 
agentO , S) 
humanO) 
terminates(e' , 5) 
in itiates(e' , 5' )  
fish(x) 
theme(x, S)  




BACKGROU ND (main DRS) 
Fig 2. 
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The predicate cmt(y,S) is explainable e.g. by the hypothesis instrument(y, S), the 
latter is explained as shown in the scenario ( 1 3), 
( 1 3) {cut(S), e causes e', 
cutting-instrument(y, e') & e causes e' � instrument(y, S), 
instrument(y, S) � role(y, S), roie(y,S) � cmt(y,S)} 
therefore cutting-instrument(y, e') » >  cmt(y,S), i.e. it is a basic explanation. 
Since the knife is inanimate, cmt(y,S) is not explainable via-agent, it is not knife­
cuttable, as a rule, so not a theme. Once the relation cmt(y,S) has been explained, 
it can be dropped from the DRS, and the update is finished. The hypothesis e 
causes e' is needed, since instruments occur only in causative situations. 
The preposition mit has also what is termed comitative use, e.g. ( 14). 
( 1 4) John schneidet Fisch mit Marcia 
John cuts fish with Marcia 
One explanation is provided by the scenario in (1 5) 
( 1 5) {cut(S), e causes e' 
carries-out-cutting-program(m, e) & e causes e' � agent(m, S), 
agent(m, S) � role(m, S), role(m, S) � cmt(m,S)} 
hence carries-out-cutting-program(m, S) » >  cmt(m,S). Another explanation of 
the relation cmt(m,S), the one via the instrumental role for Marcia is only 
implausible due to defaults for instruments/people; the way Marcia carries out the 
cutting program in this co-agentive use is a matter of world knowledge entirely, 
hence it cannot be deduced or abduced in this context, and we cannot say whether 
she is just being cheerful, or is holding a second knife. At this point we are in the 
position to explain the facts in (2)b. If the thematic structure of the situation type 
of cut in (2)c. contains no agentive event e, but only the thematic event e ', neither 
agent(Marcia,e), nor instrument(Hammer,e) are abducible5 . 
It seems to be clear how mit can be considered a very general thematic 
preposition. But its use is broader than that, and includes also abduction to the 
stereotypical knowledge about participants in the situation. 
5. Abducing to stereotypical knowledge & semantic descent 
To account for sentences like ( 1 6), Omit must be extended. Assume that Omit is a 
set of hypotheses about a situation. They arguably include relevant knowledge 
which does not structure the situation, but nevertheless is important in forming 
expectations in situations of the same type, so it can be characterized as 
stereotypical wrt. the situation. Any situation-indexed subset of Omit is then within 
a situation scheme by virtue of being either the thematic knowledge, or the 
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stereotypical knowledge. So the explanation of the use of mit in (4), repeated here 
as ( 1 6), 
( 1 6) Sie schwimrnt mit der Badekappe 
she swims with the bathing-cap 
would go like this: bathing caps are stereotypically put on during swimming, so 
she must have a cap on. However, there are two problems here. First, since 
situations do not put bathing caps on , but their agents sometime do, we need a 
kind of semantic descent from situations to their agents. Second, we have to 
specify the fonn stereotypical knowledge is put into. I will introduce the descent 
first, and then motivate the particular fonn it is cast into. 
To characterize relations in a situation as stereotypical in it a new default 
theory is needed. It should be marked by a predicate different from role. The latter 
should involve at least two individual discourse referents for the stereotypical 
relation, and one for the situation. Let ( 1 7)a. be the way stereotypical relations 
are marked in the situation S of type 't, ( 1 7b) be the default which permits the use 
of this infonnation for emt similarly to role, and R (x,y,S,) be some stereotypical 
relation accessible in S. 
( 1 7)a. R (x,y,S,) � stereotype(x,y,S,) 
b. stereotype(x,y,S,) � emt(y,S,) 
This piece of knowledge provides us with the explanation for cmt, provided we 
know that y is involved in ST. Consider ( 1 6) again. Let ( 1 8) be some default 
knowledge about bathing caps. 
( 1 8) bath-eap(y) � (agent(x,S) & swim(S) � (is_on(y, x, S)) 
This stereotypical knowledge involves both bathing caps and swimming 
situations. It connects the two. So we may conclude that it is marked as a 
stereotype for situations of the type swim(S). 
( 19) (bath-cap(y)�(agent(x,S) & swim(S)�(is_on(y,x,S)))� stereotype(x,y,S) 
The scenario in (20) explains emt(y,S), provided we have a swimming situation S, 
and an agent x in it on the one hand, and a bathing cap y on the other as facts. 
Again, emt(y,S) is the first step in the update which is discarded the moment it is 
explained. 
(20) { swim(S), bath-cap(y), agent(x,S), 
(bath-cap(y)�(agent(x,S) & swim(S)�(is _on(y,x,S)))�stereotype(x,y,S), 
stereotype(x,y,S) � emt(y,S)} 
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Whether or not some relation is thought of as stereotypical depends on a lot of 
factors like how useful it is to assume it as a part of the stereotype of a situation. 
This is different from the QUALIA structure. Consider (20) again. A possible way 
of looking for a suitable relation might be to assume that the telic role wrt. the 
QUALIA structure of bathing caps is to be put on during swimming. But this does 
not seem to be sufficient. In (2 1 )  we still have the idea that an umbrella is 
involved in the situation, so abduction would be more appropriate, since 
umbrellas cannot involve bathing in their telic roles. 
(2 1 )  She bathes with an umbrella 
So stereotypical knowledge about situations is really required, i.e. to know that 
bathing usually happens on a beach, the sun shines there, umbrellas protect from 
the sun, so she might have an umbrella with her, probably even while bathing, but 
this is implausible. 
The idea of how to construct the predicate stereotype(x,y,S) is based on a 
result about first order languages known as the Craig lemma. The underlying 
reasoning assumes that any contextual variant of emt implies it. The problem in 
the particular case of ( 16) is how to turn a statement is_on(y,x,S) about object x 
which is related to the situation S into a statement emt(y,S) about situation S. 
There must be a predicate which connects the two. There is one sort of connecting 
predicates which is guaranteed by the Craig lemma. So such predicates were used 
to defme stereotypical knowledge. The predicate stereotype(x,y,S) is a Craig 
interpolan{ 
The use of Craig interpolants in stereotypical knowledge is not an ad hoc 
solution. There are other cases which are amenable to a similar treatment. Note 
that the descent from situations to their agents is not a distinct operation. Perhaps 
some additional principles of inferencing are needed, too, which may, quite in the 
spirit of the conceptual shift theory, be termed conceptual descent from situations 
to their participants, or like QUALIA structure and type coercion, allowing to 
substitute related predicates for the original ones by enlarging their extensions in 
constrained and systematic ways. The descent from situations to their participants 
should allow to speak about loud events by implicitly defining a loudness measure 
on events in terms of loudness measure of some sounds which are involved in the 
events, for instance. This device is involved, e.g. in German verbs like 
uberschreien (overshout) which are constructed around two events measured in 
terms of the shouting done in them. Another case of this sort seems to be (22), 
which raises the problem of localizing restrictions for the semantic descent. 
(22) John schneidet Fisch mit Vergniigen 
John cuts fish with delight 
Mental attitudes are attributed to living beings, not to situations. Human agents in 
causative situations are bearers of mental attitudes, perhaps stereotypically so, but 
note that fish is inaccessible as the bearer of the attitude not because it is non­
human, but because it is a theme. The descent from situations to participants in 
them is a default operation, too, so there is no default to the effect that themes 
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have attitudes, which is somehow connected to the volitional component of 
agentivity, presumably. 
6. Interpolants as means of extending predicates 
Example (23) seems to present a problem to the approach so far. It also seems to 
be unclear, why b. and c. are unacceptable. 
(23)a. sie segelten mit dem Wind 
they sailed with the wind 
b. ??sie fuhren mit der StraBe 
they drove with the street 
c. ?? sie standen mit dem Wind 
they stood with the wind 
But it can be argued that the interpretation of the sentence is 'they sailed in the 
direction of the wind', and this interpretation is restricted to predicates denoting 
intrinsic motion, like wind, on the one side, and to motion predicates like sail on 
the other. Consider cases like mit dem FlufJ schwimmen (to swim with the 
river/with the flow), mit der Luftstromung schweben (to float/glide/soar with the 
air current), mit dem Verkehr fahren (to drive with the traffic). They seem to 
justify such an interpretation. Prerequisite to an implementation along these lines 
is something like a conceptual shift from the motion itself to its direction, e.g. 
wind is extended to cover the direction of the wind. The extension is unwarranted 
for street, hence the unacceptability of (23)b .. Craig interpolants can be put to use 
here, too. Since the wind has an inherent direction, let it be represented in (24)by a 
Skolem function dirwind(y). 
(24) wind(y) � is-direction(y, dirwind(y)) 
Assume that in some situations we can shortcut, and use the word wind to refer to 
its direction. Let such a shift be coded by the scheme (25) in general. 
(25) P(x,S) � (use-jor(x,w,S) � pew,S)) 
If x has the property P in the situation S, the predicate use-jor(x,w,S) allows to 
extend the predicate P to cover the case of w relative to S. Each particular 
extension case is permitted by an entry in the corresponding noun interpretation. 
Let (26) be such a case. 
(26) 
wind(y) & is-direction(y,dirwind(y)) & movement(S)�use-jor(y, dirwind(y),S) 
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Then (27) is the derivation of the conceptual shift, on the asswnption that sailing 
is a movement situation. As such, it also has a direction, has-direetion(dir,S) .Note 
that it is emf which is extended here, but the extension is licensed by the situation 
S of sailing! 
(27) wind(a), movement(S) 
is-direetion(a, dirwind(a» 
use Jor(a, dirwind(a),S) 
emt(a,S)�(use Jor(a, dirwind(a),S)�cmt(dirwind(a),S) 
facts 
by default (24) 
postulate (26) 
scheme (25) 
The restriction in (23)c. is because the situation of standing is not a movement 
situation; emt(dirwind(a),S) is explained by has-direction(dirwind(a), S) due to 
the fact that movement situations have directions, i.e. sail(S) � movement(S), 
movement(S) �(has-direction(w,S) � sfereotype(S,w,S» . Given this, and the 
instance of (1 7)b.,  stereotype(S, dirwind(a),S) � cmt(dirwind(a),S), 
has-direcfion(dirwind(a),S) >>> cmt(dirwind(a),S) can be established. The 
conceptual shift scheme (25) contains a Craig interpolant use-for. In other words, 
Craig interpolants are used as inferential controllers. 
7. Abduction in the lexicon 
It seems that if abductive reasoning is allowed in the lexicon, the overall picture 
of lexical knowledge changes. It becomes possible to partition the update by 
lexical information into the general part and the specific part. There is then a 
uniform mechanism which can be employed to specify the meaning to a necessary 
degree. It also seems possible to delimit interesting relational aspects of 
prepositional meaning, the aspects of those prepositions that were called thematic 
in the paper in contrast to prepositions with intrinsic meanings like locatives in or 
near. This is a consequence of the role thematic roles play under abduction: they 
are default classifiers allowing to predict some linguistic properties of situations. 
It also seems now that abductive reasoning is relevant to argwnent selection, verb 
alternations and, as the similarity in the relations to the verb is becoming more 
transparent under the treatment, also to the formal semantics of case. The profile 
of the lexicon looks like based on some all-purpose explanatory mechanism. 
However, there are also difficulties in pursuing this idea. Unconstrained abduction 
is very complex. In the particular cases studied in the paper there seems to be an 
efficient restriction in the form of indexing by situations. It remains to be seen 
whether this restriction is sufficient. There is one more aspect of abductive 
reasoning. If many hypotheses are present, some are less available than the others. 
There are different mechanisms of implementing this. Some of them explain the 
unavailability of particular hypotheses as a particular case of the mechanism 
which selects hypotheses in general, cf. Blutner (1 994). The implications of this 
approach are yet to be seen. 
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Endnotes 
* Part of the research reported here was done during the author's stay as a guest 
scientist at IBM Institute for Logic and Linguistics at Heidelberg on an invitation 
by Peter Bosch. My thanks go to Reinhard Blutner, Peter Bosch, Bianka 
Buschbeck-Wolf, Johannes Dolling, Markus Egg, Peter Gerstl, Michael Herweg, 
Hans Kamp, Jiirgen Kunze, Anke Liideling, Henk Zeevat, and Dejuan Wang. By 
default, the views expressed are those of the author. 
1 I do not want to see situations as objects like individuals or events; they are 
better thought of as ways of partitioning the world into small chunks. The closest 
relatives of situations are embeddings in the discourse representation theory of 
Kamp & Reyle ( 1993). However, changes in the model theory required by this 
view are not subject of this paper. 2 "The view I shall be espousing is that in general the meaning of a sentence only 
has application (if only, for example, determines the truth conditions) against a 
background of assumptions and practices that are not representable as a part of the 
meaning" (Searle, 1 980). 
3Friedman (1 990) suggests that people use different, if not unrelated, scales of 
measuring intervals. How such scales are involved in structuring the situation is a 
complicated matter, but involved they clearly are: John went to the pub for three 
years can be interpreted as an iterative event in the situation described by the 
sentence, cf. Egg and Herweg (1 994). 
4 Dowty (1 989) refers to what I call thematic structure by the term 'individual 
thematic roles', and to what I see as 8-roles by the term 'thematic role type'. But 
the idea is the same, although a representational view is taken in this paper, and a 
model-theoretic one in Dowty's papers. To quote Dowty ( 199 1 )  ' . . .  thematic role 
types may form a system of prototypes for classifying events, that is, a set of 
typical ways in which the various participants of cognitively and culturally 
relevant types of events interact in these events 
5 In Strigin ( 1 994) it is suggested that constraints on default use can block the 
portion of structure which is used to provide the causative hypothesis. Constraints 
are introduced in Poole ( 1988). But this is only one part of the explanation. The 
other part requires a reconstruction of Dowty's ( 1991 )  proto-roles and argument 
selection principles in the abductive framework of the present paper. This is still 
work in progress. 
6 A condition imposed by the setting in this paper is that there are at least two 
theories involved in computing the conextual variants. One is the theory of the 
underspecified invariant, the other a contextual variant in the situation scheme. 
This invites the use of Craig interpolants, cf. Kleene (1967) or Fitting ( 1 99 1 ). Let 
T and T' be two theories. If X� Y is provable in TvT', and X in in the 
vocabulary of T, Y in the vocabulary of T', then there is a formula Z all individual 
and predicate parameters of which are both in T and in T', and for which holds 
that X�Z is provable in T and Z� Y is provable in T' . This is the Craig lemma, 
325 
326 Anatoli Strigin 
and Z is called a Craig interpolant. In the simplest case encode the way of proving 
parts of the implication we need using some Craig interpolant at the juncture of 
the two theories. It is improtant, that this interpolant is motivated. Stereotypical 
knowledge seems to be a sufficient justification for introducing the interpolant. 
Another motivation will be introduced in the next section. Hobbs et al. (1 993) 
make use of this device, but in a more unconstrained way. 
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